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CONSTITUnONAL LAw-PETTY OFFENDER'S IGHT To DEMAND TIAL
BY JURY: P=TY OFFENDERS HAVE PEERs iN ALASKA-Baker v. City
of Fairbanks, 471 P.2d 386 (Alas. 1970).
Procter J. Baker was charged with violation of a Fairbanks ordi-
nance for the offense of assault' and demanded a trial by jury in the
district court. Baker contended that the holding of the United States
Supreme Court in Duncan v. Louisiana' was dispositive of his case and
that he was entitled to a jury trial as a matter of constitutional right,3
even though the maximum possible punishment was limited to $600
fine or 60 days imprisonment or both.4 Upon the trial court's denial of
his asserted right, Baker petitioned for direct review5 by the Alaska
Supreme Court. The Alaska court declined to rule on the petition on
the basis of federal constitutional law, as expressed in Duncan, but
reversed the trial court's ruling on the basis of the jury trial guarantee
of the Alaska constitution. In applying article I, section 11 of the
Alaska constitution, the court held that the accused was guaranteed
the right to demand trial by jury in any criminal prosecution which
carried the possible penalty of incarceration, the loss of an important
license or occupational permit or the social stigma arising from con-
viction for an offense commonly regarded by the community as criminal.
Baker v. City of Fairbanks, 471 P.2d 386 (Alas. 1970).
The United States Supreme Court in Duncan v. Louisiana held that
the right to jury trial guaranteed by the sixth amendment of the federal
constitution was applicable to the states under the fourteenth amend-
ment 1 In announcing the national standard the Supreme Court based
its decision on the concept that the jury trial was fundamental in the
1. The offense charged was also a violation of a state statute. AS.Asx STAT. § 11.15.230
(1962).
2. 391 US. 145 (1968).
3. Baker relied upon U.S. CoxsT. amend. VI:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury....
4. The maximum punishment that could have been imposed in Duncan included two
years imprisonment, a $300 fine or both. 391 U.S. at 146.
5. Ai.s. Sup. CT. R. 23-24.
6. ALAs. CoNsT. art. I, § 11:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of twelve, except that the legislature may provide
for a jury of not more than twelve nor less than six in courts not of record. . . .
7. 391 U.S. at 156.
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systems of criminal justice found in the states.8 Since the right was
deemed fundamental, the federal notion of due process of law guaran-
teed by the fourteenth amendment extended the right to a jury trial
to accused persons in state criminal proceedings. The sweep and effect
of Duncan were restricted, however, in one important respect: the right
to a jury trial was not guaranteed to persons who would not be entitled
to the right if tried for the same or comparable offense in a federal
court. As a minimum standard the Supreme Court suggested that a
"cpetty" offense carrying a possible sentence of up to six months im-
prisonment would not require a jury trial.10 A significant feature of the
Duncan decision is the absence of firm guidelines to assist in distin-
guishing the "petty" offense that does not entitle the offender to demand
trial by jury, from the "serious" offense that does carry the guarantee.1
In fashioning a "petty" offense exception to the seemingly compre-
hensive sixth amendment jury trial provision, the Supreme Court relied
on the English and American common law practice at the time the
Constitution was framed,'" the widespread acceptance of the categori-
zation,' 3 and the policy considerations which favor expediting and
simplifying judicial administration when relatively minor offenses are
involved. 4
8. 391 U.S. at 149 & n.14.
9. The right to trial by jury was the last of the sixth amendment rights to be
applied to state criminal proceedings under the "incorporation" theory. Its predecessors
were in re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948) (right to a public trial) ; Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (right
to confront opposing witnesses); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967)
(right to a speedy trial) ; and Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (right to com-
pulsory process to obtain presence of witnesses).
10. 391 U.S. at 159. The six month standard adopted by the Supreme Court was
apparently based on the delineation prescribed by Congress for the federal court system.
See 18 U.S.C. § 1(3) (1964).
11. The absence of firm guidelines has been corrected somewhat by the additional
guidance found in Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970), in which the Supreme
Court rejected a proposed misdemeanor-felony distinction and required that if the
maximum authorized penalty exceeded six months confinement the accused had the right
to demand trial by jury.
12. 391 U.S. at 160; Frankfurter & Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses and the Con-
stitutional Guaranty of Trial by Jury, 39 HARv. L. REV. 917 (1926).
13. For example, the Washington Supreme Court has followed the petty-serious
formula in determining the petty offender's right to jury trial. State ex rel. O'Brien v.
Towne, 64 Wn. 2d 581, 392 P.2d 818 (1964). In a pre-Duncan decision involving the
right to jury trial, the Washington court anticipated the Supreme Court's extension of
the federal standard to the states as a federal constitutional requirement. George v. Day,
69 Wn. 2d 836, 420 P.2d 677 (1966).
14. The Supreme Court regarded the benefit of the accused of trial by jury as "in-
sufficient to outweigh the benefits to efficient law enforcement and simplified judicial
administration resulting from the availability of speedy and inexpensive non-jury ad-
judications" 391 U.S. at 160.
828
Jury Trial
In considering petitioner's main contention that Duncan was dis-
positive of his right to trial by jury, the Alaska court reasoned that the
Supreme Court did not intend to make the federal petty offense stan-
dard a mechanical test for the states to apply, and determined that
further analysis was necessary. 15 After reviewing the line of decisions
in which the right to jury trial was held to exist for some offenses but
not for others, the court found that the recurring question had been
where the petty-serious offense line should be drawn.16 The Alaska
court, however, asked why it should be necessary to draw a line at all,
when the language of the sixth amendment is free of any mention of
exceptions to the stated right, and concluded that the common law and
historical bases for denial of the right to jury trial were inconclusive
and inadequate.17 Unlike the Supreme Court, which emphasized histori-
cal custom in Duncan,8 the Alaska court in Baker found the historic
15. Mr. Justice White, writing for the majority in Duncan, emphasized that the
maximum possible penalty authorized for the offense was a controlling factor but con-
cluded that other factors, such as the social consequences attaching to a criminal con-
viction, were likewise significant. 391 U.S. at 159. This view of the maximum authorized
penalty was reaffirmed in Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970).
16. That there should be a petty-serious delineation was espoused in Frankfurter and
Corcoran's classic discussion of the historic common law right to jury trial. Frankfurter &
Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses and the Constitutional Guaranty of Trial by Jury,
39 HARV. L. Rrv. 917 (1926). But cf. Kaye, Petty Offenders Have No Peers!, 26 U.
CH. L. REv. 245 (1959).
The Supreme Court's difficulty in ascertaining where the petty-serious line should lie
is illustrated by the following cases: District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617 (1937)
(sale of unused railway tickets held petty); District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63
(1930) (reckless driving held serious); Schick v. U.S., 195 U.S. 65 (1904) (violation of
oleomargarine stamp statute held petty); Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540 (1888) (labor
conspiracy offense, punishable by 30 days confinement or $25 fine, held serious); Natal
v. Louisiana, 139 US. 621 (1891) (municipal market permit violation, carrying the
same maximum penalty as the offense in Callan, held petty).
The court's inconsistency and reliance on historical and common law bases to dis-
tinguish petty from serious offenses have led to ridiculous results in the lower federal
courts; see, e.g., Gaithor v. United States, 251 A.2d 644 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1968),
where it was held that the accused was not entitled to trial by jury for the offense of
solicitation for oral sodomy, since the penalty included only 90 days imprisonment or
$250 fine or both.
17. The Alaska court concluded that there was no firm line drawn between those
offenses that merited a jury trial at the time the federal Constitution was drafted and
those offenses that did not. 471 P.2d at 391-92. See Frankfurter & Corcoran, supra note
16, at 927. Common law history reveals such vagaries as a summary trial proceeding
leading to a sentence of up to seven years imprisonment. See sources in note 12, supra.
18. The Supreme Court weighed the long-standing practice carefully:
So-called petty offenses were tried without juries both in England and in the Colonies
and have always been held to be exempt from the otherwise comprehensive language
of the Sixth Amendment's jury trial provisions.
391 U.S. at 160.
The Alaska court does not meet the historical argument in Duncan squarely, but the
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pattern insufficient to support continuation of the petty-serious dis-
tinction as an implied exception to the right to jury trial "in all criminal
prosecutions."
The policy reasons found in Duncan to justify and support denial of
jury trials for petty offenders were discussed at length by the Alaska
court in Baker and it is in this area that the court's analysis is most
significant. At a time in our national history when the effectiveness of
our criminal justice system is undergoing considerable critical scru-
tiny,19 expediency and convenience in criminal procedure are valuable
policy considerations, according to Duncan."0 Although the Alaska
court conceded that expediency was a valid objective, it reasoned that
the expressly-given constitutional right to a jury trial could not be
subordinated to expediency considerations unless they were also derived
from the Constitution.2' The court found no authority among the
enumerated powers of the Constitution to justify expediency as a basis
for distinguishing between the rights of the petty offender on the one
hand and the serious offender on the other. Further, the court found
that expediency was not a controlling factor in guaranteeing each
defendant other individual constitutional rights, including the right to
counsel.22 Central to the court's rejection of expediency as a controlling
court's view of the inertia of custom as a limiting factor on the development of the
law is characterized by the following:
We recognize that this decision represents an advance from what historically was
thought by some to be the necessary extent of jury trial in criminal cases. But the
evolving spirit of due process must be discerned and made effective as civilization
advances. We reach a point when the crudities of an earlier time must be aban-
doned.
471 P.2d at 403.
19. E.g., PRESIDENT'S ComI-eIssIoN ON LAW ENFORCEIMENT & ADMNISTRATION or
JUSTICE, REPORT ON THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOcIETY (1967).
20. The Supreme Court in Duncan viewed the burdensome consequences of providing
jury trials to petty offenders with some alacrity. 391 U.S. at 160. Experience with jury
trials for misdemeanors in areas where they are afforded has revealed, however, that the
right has not been subject to abuse and that jury trials for petty offenses are relatively
infrequent. LAW ENFORCEMENT IN THE METROPOLIS 141 (D. McIntyre, Sr., ed. 1967).
21. The unequivocal language of the sixth amendment leaves no doubt as to the
literal scope of the right to jury trial in criminal prosecutions. Under a constitutional
theory of enumerated and reserved powers, convenience and expediency seemingly do
not have and should not have priority over the retained rights of the individual.
22. The Alaska court cited in re Johnson, 62 Cal. 2d 325, 398 P.2d 420 (1965), in
which it was held that the accused has the right to counsel if conviction results in in-
carceration. But cf. Hendrix v. Seattle, 76 Wn. 2d 142, 456 P.2d 696 (1969), noted in 46
WASH. L. REv. 185 (1970), in which the Washington court adhered to the view that an
accused charged with a minor offense was not entitled to counsel furnished at public
expense. See Junker, The Right to Counsel in Misdemeanor Cases, 43 WASH. L. Rxv. 685
(1968).
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policy consideration is the idea that efficient administration of the
criminal justice system should not create a significant implied exception
to an express fundamental right.
Although the decision rested on the determination of a state con-
stitutional issue,23 the court, in dictum, stated that it was not limited
to federal standards of interpretation when comparable constitutional
rights were in issue.24 It appears certain, however, that Duncan was
not intended to establish a maximum standard for application of a
federal constitutional right for petty offenders, but rather that the
Supreme Court intended to fashion minimum standards only.2 It
follows from this analysis that the Alaska court would not have been in
conflict with the intent of the Supreme Court in Duncan even if Baker
had been decided on federal constitutional grounds. Although the basis
of the Baker decision was an analysis of Alaska constitutional law, the
reasons advanced by the court involving federal constitutional law do
23. Defendants in the Territory of Alaska could demand trial by jury in any justice
court proceeding which might result in punishment by fine or imprisonment. Act of
March 3, 1899, ch. 41, §§ 410, 419, 30 Stat. 1253. The Alaska court determined that
this right had continued without substantial change or modification and was in existence
at the time the state constitution's jury trial provision was drafted and adopted. The
right to demand jury trial had been available on a broad basis for virtually all offenses
and the court found that the framers intended it to continue; the Alaska court therefore
held, as a matter of state constitutional law, that Baker was entitled to demand trial by
jury for his municipal code violation. 471 P.2d at 398-401. The court expressly overruled
its earlier decision in Knudsen v. City of Anchorage, 358 P.2d 375 (Alas. 1960), in
which the court had adopted the petty offense rule.
24. Other jurisdictions have chosen to act in areas of doctrinal importance before
the Supreme Court has either been presented with an opportunity or undertaken to
decide significant constitutional issues: People v. Donovan, 13 N.Y.2d 148, 193 N.E.2d 628,
243 N.Y.S.2d 841 (1963) (right to counsel during police interrogation) ; Perez v. Lippold,
32 Cal. 2d 711, 198 P.2d 17 (1948) (miscegenation statute held unconstitutional) ; People
v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955) (exclusionary rule of evidence). It appears
that few courts, if any, have erred, if their decisions came down on the side of individual
rights.
The view more typically encountered concerning the weight usually afforded Supreme
Court interpretations of language similar to that found in state constitutions and under-
going construction by state courts is expressed in the following terms by the Washington
court:
[W]here the language of the state constitution is similar to that of the federal con-
stitution, the language . . . should receive the same definition as that which has
been given ... by the United States Supreme Court.
Tacoma v. Heater, 67 Wn. 2d 733, 736, 409 P.2d 867, 869 (1966). See also State v. Moore
79 Wn. 2d 51, 56-57, 483 P.2d 630, 634 (1971).
25. The petty-serious formulation expressed in Duncan does not restrict the power of
the states to exceed the national standard in affording jury trials for offenses other than
those in the "serious" category. The Supreme Court anticipated that most states would
continue to apply the petty offense rule, as specified in Duncan and -elaborated upon in
Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970), rather than emasculate it as Alaska has done.
391 U.S. at 158.
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not appear precluded or limited by Duncan. At the heart of the Alaska
court's reasoning, however, is a fundamental divergence from the rea-
soning found in Duncan. Throughout the opinion the court maintains
that the plain language of the sixth amendment is clear and that the
court is merely giving that language its obviously correct meaning.2-
The effect of Baker, however, is a firm rejection of the bases supporting
the petty-serious dichotomy of the Duncan opinion. While it is true that
Alaska has a history of affording jury trials to petty offenders,' the
Alaska court's view and analysis of what is fundamentally fair in
criminal proceedings make the Baker decision far more significant than
simply a determination of state law. 8
Rather than attempting to draw lines between types of offenses and
degrees of punishment, the Alaska court seeks to appraise the true im-
pact of any criminal conviction, whether petty or serious, on the indi-
vidual offender and the community in which he functions 29 The policy
considerations of expediency and efficiency do not muster persuasive-
ness when considered in light of the social and economic consequences
of a criminal conviction. Of particular importance to the court was the
situation of the defendant whose offense is minor in the view of the
court personnel who administer the system but catastrophic to the non-
recidivist, first-time offender experiencing unique contact with the crim-
inal courts. It is not the possible punishment that weighs heavily on
such a defendant, but rather his very appearance before the court as
an accused. Accordingly, it is at this moment that the offender must be
afforded those rights that are regarded as fundamental if due process
of law is to carry its full and intended meaning. Though not discussed
by the court, the situation of the recidivist cannot be considered
26. 471 P.2d at 388, 395, 403.
27. Note 23, supra.
28. An intriguing problem involving the concept of federalism and the criminal law
is presented in light of the Alaska court's decision to proceed beyond the national stan-
dard prescribed in Duncan. An assumption implicit in the Baker approach is that the
constitutional due process standards framed by the Supreme Court are minimal guidelines
only and that the states can take creative steps to afford criminal defendants protection
beyond that which has been termed a federal code of criminal procedure. Friendly, The
Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CALiF. L. REv. 929 (1965). No
critical or irreconcilable problem exists, however, because, in the words of Justice
Brandeis, "[Olne of the happy incidents of the federal system [is] that a single
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory .... " New State Ice
Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (dissenting opinion).
29. 471 P.2d at 395, 396.
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less serious because he has encountered the criminal system on previous
occasions; the consequences of conviction for a minor offense can be
more far-reaching for such an accused, especially if a parole or proba-
tionary status is involved.3 °
It is likely that conditions unique to Alaska, including its pre-
vious history of affording jury trials for minor offenses during its
existence as a territory, make the policy approach taken by the Alaska
court feasible. While other states experiment with various means31 to
ease clogged criminal dockets which may result in increased imperson-
alization and decreased concern for individual defendants, Alaska is
proceeding in the opposite direction toward increased recognition of the
individual and his rights.
Whether a similar approach to the right to jury-trial would be taken
by the courts of other states is uncertain, but it should be noted that
the United States Supreme Court recently held that a six-member jury
satisfied the requirements of due process," thus making possible re-
duced costs and delays for states, like Alaska, choosing to extend the
right to trial by jury. Washington, for example, has a constitutional
provision authorizing the legislature to provide for six-member juries
in courts not of record, indicating that the framers of the state con-
stitution contemplated simplified jury trials in those courts which
ordinarily hear and determine less serious violations. 8
While it could be argued that the decision of the Alaska court was
30. See, e.g., WASHr. R.v. CODE § 72.04A.090 (1969). The summary arrest and confine-
ment procedures to which the parolee is subject in the event of his violation of state law
demand close scrutiny of the factual issues leading to the subsequent charge. In view of
the dual nature of the punishment facing the parolee, the need for strict adherence to
sixth amendment guarantees is more urgent in his situation than for the first offender.
31. The most common means are increased funding and staffing for the criminal
judicial machinery. E.g., the difficulties encountered in New York City are perhaps
extreme, but the language of the court in these cases is illustrative: People v. Moses, 57
Misc. 2d 960, 294 N.Y.S.2d 12 (N.Y. City Ct. 1968); People v. Bowdoin, 57 Misc. 2d
536, 293 N.Y.S.2d 748 (N.Y. City Ct. 1968). Additional descriptions of the problem and
suggested remedies are found in Conference on Legal Manpower Needs of Criminal Law,
Report, 41 F.R.D. 389 (1966).
32. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
33. WAsH. CozsT. amend. X. Evidence of early action taken by the Washington
legislature is found in WAsH. REv. CODE § 10.04.050 (1956):
In all trials for offenses within the jurisdiction of a justice of the peace, the defendant
may demand a jury, which shall consist of six, or a less number, agreed upon by
the state and the accused, to be impaneled and sworn as in civil cases ....
It would appear that the legislative authority exists to implement a stream-lined jury
system for minor offenses of the type that was approved by the Supreme Court in
Williams.
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made easier due to the absence of congested urban areas, combined
with an abundance of natural wealth, the court did not fail to consider
the decision's impact on the state's judicial administration. The court
relied on data available from jurisdictions in which the right to jury
trial was available to petty offenders; those states did not and have
not yet experienced any paralyzing effects due to the availability of jury
trials for minor offenses. 4 Nor should it be assumed that the right to
trial by jury in Alaska is available in all cases heard in criminal courts;
expressly excluded are offenses in violation of regulatory rather than
criminal statutes and proceedings in which possible license revocation
would be based on public health or welfare criteria. The court also
limited the right to demand trial by jury for offenses which did not
carry the possible punishment of imprisonment.35 The exceptions
framed by the court appear to be valid for the reason that enforcement
of statutes directed at the regulation of property are not strictly
criminal prosecutions within the language of the sixth amendment. In
addition, licenses which may be revoked pursuant to violations of
public health and safety regulations are not considered to belong to
the defendant as a matter of right when countervailing considerations
of public protection under the state's police power are involved.
The posture of the Alaska court regarding the petty offender's right
to jury trial raises the question whether a similar approach will be taken
with respect to the right to counsel, which is also guaranteed by the
sixth amendment. From a practical point of view the right to a trial by
jury seems of little utility if counsel is not afforded the defendant. The
role of counsel in assuring the accuracy and integrity of the proceed-
ings is of at least equal importance to the legitimate interests of a
defendant as the right to a jury of his peers. 6 As a matter of constitu-
34. A significant number of Southern states have historically afforded petty offendersjury trials, notably Georgia, Texas, Alabama, Tennessee and North Carolina; California
likewise does not recognize an implied exception to the right to jury trial. For a summary
of data on the status of the right to jury trial and statistics resulting therefrom, see
H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AmE.ICAN JURY 18-19, app. A (1966).
35. 471 P.2d at 402.
36. In fact, until recently, it could be persuasively argued that refusing a defendant
counsel would impair his legitimate interests to a far greater degree than would refusing
him the right to a jury trial. Recent empirical data indicates, however, that jury trials
show a significant net leniency in favor of the defendant in contrast to trials at the bench.
This new data indicates only that trial by jury is important, of course, and not that the
right to counsel is not equally vital. Junker, The Right to Counsel in Misdemeanor
Cases, 43 WASH. L. Rlv. 685, 708 (1968). Professor Junker relies on data collected in
H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, Ti AmECAx JURY 59 (1966).
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tional interpretation, the language guaranteeing every criminal defen-
dant the right to counsel is as broad as the language referring to the
right to trial by jury. 7 Thus the Alaska court's rejection of the petty-
serious standard in giving the state constitution its plain and obvious
meaning would seem to require a similar result concerning the right to
counsel.
The policy reasons discussed in Baker are also supportive of a broad
right to counsel. Both the right to counsel and the right to a trial by
jury are distinguishable from other sixth amendment rights in that
they require sizable expenditures of state funds.38 The Baker court's
weighing of the fundamental rights of a defendant more heavily than
the resulting cost to society should also extend to the equally important
right to counsel. An objection to broader application of the right to
counsel is inadequate lawyer manpower.3 9 This problem was not dealt
with in Baker, but if a serious deprivation results from an implied
exception to an otherwise fundamental right, personnel shortages lack
persuasiveness as a controlling policy criterion. The court's unwilling-
ness to see expediency and economy as determinative seems equally
applicable to manpower considerations. In sum, the approach adopted
by the Alaska court in Baker raises the likelihood that the right to
counsel may be similarly broadened in the future.
CONCLUSION
It is doubtful that other state courts will reach the same result as
the Alaska court on the issue of the petty offender's right to demand
trial by jury; tradition, custom, the inertia of stare decisis and pressures
focused on the streamlining of judicial machinery are major obstacles
difficult to overcome. But this is not to discredit the Alaska court's
perspicacity in the area of fundamental fairness in criminal proceed-
ings. The fact that Alaska is in a unique position because of its history
to afford a broader range of constitutional rights to petty offenders
37. ALs. CoNsT. § 11 provides in part:
Rights of Accused. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to ...
have the assistance of cousel for his defense. (Emphasis added).
38. Junker, The Right to Counsel in Misdemeanor Cases, 43 WAsH. L. Rav. 685, 707
(1968).
39. Id. at 716.
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within its borders which is not available in most other jurisdictions
does not diminish the important constitutional progress that marks the
Baker decision. While the court professes to give both the federal and
Alaska constitutions their obvious and simple meanings, the philosophic
basis of the decision advances an important individual right far beyond
the national standard established in Duncan. The Alaska court has
added an important dimension to the concept of due process of law "in
this dawning of the Age of Aquarius."40 If other states similarly con-
clude that the practical problems arising from such an expansion of the
rights of accused are not prohibitive, Baker stands as a model for fur-
ther reform at the state level.
40. Baker, 471 P.2d at 403.
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